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Governance, Federalism, and Organizing Institutions to Manage
Complex Problems
Luke Fowler
Boise State University
Abstract
In managing complex policy problems in the federal system, state and local governments are
organized into different arrangements for translating policy goals into policy outcomes. The
authors use air quality management as a test case to understand these variations and their impact
on policy outcomes. With data from Clean Air Act implementation plans and a survey of state
and local air quality managers, the authors identify five separate institutional designs: 1) central
agencies; 2) top-down; 3) donor-recipient; 4) regional agencies; and, 5) emergent governance.
Findings indicate that some arrangements (donor-recipient and emergent governance) result in
notably better air quality than others (central agencies, top-down). Specifically, when designed
to allow bargaining between state and local officials, intergovernmental management is still the
most effective approach to complex policy problems; but, in absence of this, conventional
federalism arrangements are less effective than public agencies self-organizing around shared
policy goals.
Over the last several decades, national, state, and local governments have become interdependent as they work together
to manage complex policy problems, with new sophisticated forms of governance emerging in recent years that
challenge conventional hierarchies in the federal system (McGuire, 2006; Feiock and Scholz, 2009). Nevertheless,
remnants of previous federalism eras are still present as some public agencies fail to adapt to new circumstances and
fall back on outmoded forms of intergovernmental relations (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001). As such, distribution of
administrative reforms and coordination mechanisms are uneven across the federal system, with some governments
pro-actively pursuing innovative solutions while others rely on more traditional tools (Moynihan, 2005).
Consequently, multiple institutional designs exist simultaneously. A fundamental issue determining the effectiveness
of these designs is the creation and mitigation of transaction costs during service delivery, which affects process
efficiency and program outcomes. While each institutional design has strengths and weaknesses, there are important
tradeoffs made that affect public service delivery.
There are few comparisons of how such variations affect policy outcomes when dealing with complex policy
problems, creating limitations in understanding how we govern these problems. This is especially important in relation
to conventional forms of intergovernmental management compared to emergent governance approaches, which
represents a contrast between traditional and state-of-the-art public management theory. A prime example of this is
air quality management and implementation of the Clean Air Act (CAA), where, over time, separate arrangements for
coordinating state and local resources developed across states (Woods and Potoski, 2010). Using data from State
Implementation Plans (SIPs) and a survey of state and local air managers, we identify five separate institutional
designs: 1) central agencies, where policy implementation is centralized within a single state agency; 2) top-down,
where local agencies are co-opted as administrative sub-units of the state; 3) donor-recipient, where implementation
involves bargaining between state and local agencies; 4) regional agencies, where intermediate agencies serve a
specialized policy function at the regional-level; and, 5) emergent governance, where local agencies use innovation to
govern policy problems outside of state-led management strategies.
As such, our goal here is to examine institutional designs in order to ascertain how complex policy problems are
managed within a federal system, and to compare conventional forms of intergovernmental management to emergent
governance approaches (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001; Feiock and Scholz, 2009). We first describe institutional
designs in terms of organization, advantages, and constraints for air quality management. Then, we examine their
effects on air quality outcomes with a dataset of 363 Air Quality Control Regions (AQCRs) (Woods and Potoski,
2010; Fowler, 2016). Findings indicate that some institutional designs (donor-recipient and emergent governance)
result in notably better air quality than others (central agencies). More specifically, when designed to allow bargaining
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between state and local officials, intergovernmental management is still the most effective approach to complex policy
problems; but, in absence of this, intergovernmental management is less effective than public agencies self-organizing
around shared policy goals.
Context of Air Quality Management in the U.S.
Air quality provides an adept case to examine effects of institutional designs on an inter-jurisdictional policy problem
with ambiguous causes, effects, and parameters (Cannibal and Lemon, 2000). Under the CAA, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) sets national standards and oversees states efforts, while states develop SIPs to achieve
compliance with those standards. With a bevy of administrative rules, pollution control strategies, and monitoring
sites, states organize managerial efforts differently based on unique circumstances within their jurisdictions. One key
difference between states is how SIPs incorporate local governments into implementation systems, which ranges from
explicit preemption to intergovernmental partnership. Local government roles in CAA implementation are primarily
a function of the policy challenge that exists with worsening air quality increasing the likelihood that states rely on
local agencies for implementation assistance. Additionally, local air agencies are more likely to emerge when there
are strong environmental advocacy groups either as a result of states attempting to shift blame or local governments
engaging in bottom-up activism. To this end, previous research indicates that local air agencies tend to have positive
effects on air quality, but it depends on their authorities and relationships with state agencies (Woods and Potoski,
2010; Fowler, 2016, 2018b, 2019a).
For the most part, air quality policy is a function of specific technical and/or political challenges that are unique to
local areas. As Woods and Potoski (2010) frame it: “the policy challenge underlying pollution is balancing its
environmental and health costs against its economic benefits. Achieving the optimal balance between the two is easier
when the pollution is narrowly concentrated in a region rather than widely dispersed across different local climates
and geographies” (p. 722). Thus, local expertise is essential to policy implementation in order to develop policies,
procedures, and strategies that address specific mixtures of pollutants, sources, and health impacts. Additionally,
translating national programs into local communities requires creation and maintenance of political coalitions that
legitimize and support administrative decisions, so local governments provide political capital to programs that is
essential for success (Reed, 2014). While local agencies are an asset in intergovernmental implementation, they also
create uncertainty in how policy implementation, so there are institutional barriers that constrain how state and local
agencies interact (Potoski, 1999, 2002; Feiock and Scholz, 2009; Fowler, 2019b). As a result, recent scholarship notes
an increasing level of policy innovation from local air agencies as they attempt to fill gaps in state and/or federal
programs (Woods and Potoski, 2010; Fowler, 2018b, 2019b; Fowler and Rabinowitz, 2019).
Competing Institutional Designs
Using SIPs and a survey of air managers, we identify five institutional designs: 1) central agency; 2) top-down; 3)
donor-recipient; 4) regional agency; and, 5) emergent governance. Institutional designs entail tradeoffs in transaction
costs and local implementation capacities, so some designs are better suited for mediating circumstances in which air
quality management occurs than others. Local managers serve as key agents in this by using their expertise to mitigate
unique local challenges. Therefore, local agencies are included in several institutional designs, but with coordination
mechanisms differing. Importantly, air quality is a complex regional problem, so local agencies may only have
jurisdiction over a portion of an AQCR. As such, effects of institutional designs may be dependent on relative
jurisdictional size, where benefits of integrating local agencies into institutional designs are a function of scale of local
authority over air quality. Table 1 provides a comparison of institutional designs based on agencies, coordination
mechanisms, advantages, and constraints.
[Table 1 about here]
First, central agency designs centralize CAA implementation within a state agency, so SIPs exclude local governments
from directly implementing policy. In effect, state environmental agencies have a policy monopoly and rely solely
on internal resources and capacity. Central agency designs are the most common approach to CAA implementation
and are the exclusive mechanism for air quality management in 24 states, such as Georgia, Idaho, Michigan, New
Hampshire, New Jersey and Virginia. In most of these states, SIPs explicitly preempt local governments from
adopting or enforcing air quality regulations, so state agencies have exclusive authority over air quality. In other
states, administrative regulations create institutional barriers to devolving powers to local agencies in order to reduce
uncertainty in implementation choices (Potoski, 1999, 2002; Potoski and Woods, 2001; Woods and Potoski, 2010;
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EPA 2018c; NACAA, 2018). Additionally, as state agencies have CAA primacy in all 50 states, they have primar y
responsibility for ensuring compliance, so this design is the default in absence of local agencies. As such, it exists in
AQCRs across 49 states.1
Under this arrangement, costs principally arise in monitoring and enforcement, although production, finance, and
delivery costs increase with organizational complexity. Thus, the basic structure of these designs minimizes
transaction costs incurred from coordinating multiple organizations and reduces bureaucratic layers between decisionmakers and enforcement or monitoring at the street-level. Although this may be the simplest solution, and therefore
the one with the lowest effective transaction costs, there are drawbacks. Most significantly, these designs limit
organizations to their own internal capacities, which may be insufficient to manage the existing air quality problems.
State air managers lack access to local implementation expertise when developing management strategies, and are
constrained by their own organizational boundaries (e.g., resources, authorities). Additionally, policy monopolies
may result in high costs or inefficient services across systems due to ineconomies of scales, institutional barriers, or
duplicated efforts (Waterman and Meier, 1998; Brown and Potoski, 2003; Hefetz and Warner, 2012). Central agency
designs serve as a baseline for comparison for other types of designs, as they are both the simplest and most common.
Second, although decisions continue to be centralized, top-down institutional designs incorporate local governments
(i.e., cities, counties) into CAA implementation as subunits of state agencies in order to establish a coordinated mission
across levels of government (Woods and Potoski, 2010; Fowler, 2018a). For example, Tennessee’s SIP establishes
the Department of Conservation (TDEC) as the lead agency for CAA implementation, and provides TDEC the
authority to develop pollution control strategies, regulations, and administrative procedures accordingly. In the
Memphis area though, TDEC delegates enforcement authority to the Shelby County Department of Health (SCDH),
which oversees permitting, inspections, enforcement, and manages compliance within the county’s jurisdiction. In
general, this places SCDH as a subordinate of TDEC, with TDEC dictating SCDH’s role and responsibilities in
regional air management. While local ordinances for air quality exist, they were crafted at the state-level and then
adopted into code by local officials. For instance, with a few exceptions, Shelby’s County Air Code is the state’s Air
Pollution Regulations with references to state agencies replaced with references to Shelby County agencies (SCDH,
2018). Other states with similar top-down arrangements for specific municipalities include Arizona, Iowa, Nebraska,
and Florida.
In practice, subnational governments have limited autonomy and administrators serve primarily as compliance
managers. From the state perspective, this provides additional administrative capacity and local expertise as well as
resources and air quality specific assets (e.g., testing equipment). Furthermore, joint production reduces information
asymmetries (i.e., one party having more or better information than the other) and fosters policy learning by creating
cost or quality comparisons between producers. Additionally, multiple service agencies creates competition that puts
further pressure on producers to find efficiencies, as well as safeguards against production failures (Brown and
Potoski, 2003, 2004; Brown, Potoski, and Van Slyke, 2006, 2008; Hefetz and Warner, 2012). Some criticize topdown approaches for not accounting for either representative bureaucracy or the inherently political nature of public
service delivery (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001; Lipsky, 2010).
More specifically, when constrained to a compliance role, local managers neither adapt policies nor experiment with
different implementation mechanisms to match programs to local socio-economic, political, or technical challenges.
Local expertise is then trapped in a rigid administrative framework, limiting its potential utility. Furthermore, working
with external organizations creates transaction costs in communicating, coordinating, or managing that typically occur
in the process of negotiating power dynamics, overseeing compliance, or dividing labor and benefits across
organizations. Additionally, in principal-agent relationships, inefficiencies may result from goal incongruence, work
shirking, or maximizing payoffs (Waterman and Meier, 1998; Brown and Potoski, 2003; Hefetz and Warner, 2012;
Carr and Hawkins, 2013). This is particularly important if local managers view this relationship as coercive rather
than cooperative, which increases potential for local agencies to take advantage of information asymmetries (Fowler,
2018a). Consequently, top-down designs limit the utility of incorporating local agencies into CAA implementation,
so they rarely lead to real improvements in air quality compared to central agency designs.
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Top-Down Design Hypothesis: In comparison to central agency designs, top-down designs will not be correlated
with improved air quality.
Third, donor-recipient institutional designs allow state and local agencies to bargain in the process of implementing
the CAA in order to adjust the program to local realities. For example, although Alabama’s SIP establishes the
Department of Environmental Management (ADEM) as the lead agency for CAA implementation, it also delegates
authorities to Jefferson County to develop a local implementation plan, with local officials developing administrative
procedures as well as having authority to set air quality standards above state minimums (EPA, 2018c, Jefferson
County, 2018). In addition to boilerplate goals established at federal and state-levels, Jefferson County specifically
outlines as policy goals to “foster the comfort and convenience of the people, promote the social development of
Jefferson County and facilitate the enjoyment of natural attractions…[by] provid[ing] for a coordinated program of
air pollution prevention, abatement and control” (Jefferson County Board of Health, 2018). Consequently, in addition
to enforcement of more convention command-and-control regulations, Jefferson County incorporates air quality issues
into its larger transportation, energy, and smart growth planning. In other words, Jefferson County is aligning their
efforts with state and federal policies, but also working to provide specific environmental benefits within its
jurisdiction that would otherwise by superfluous for state or federal agencies. Other states with donor-recipient
arrangements with specific municipalities include North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Texas.
While this design runs into some of the same transaction costs incurred in top-down designs, local capacities are more
effectively used to match national policy goals to subnational political realities. By actively negotiating resource
exchanges, program requirements, and responsibilities with their state counterparts, local managers are able to develop
process efficiencies and more effective regulatory strategies. While local agencies are still part of state-led systems,
bargaining power provides local managers with opportunities to challenge that leadership, and creates more “buy in.”
Although these negotiations may create new transaction costs, over time, state and local officials become better at
negotiating, which ultimately leads to reduced transaction costs and increased program effectiveness. While everyone
may not always comply, donor-recipient designs create a more flexible framework than central agency or top-down
designs, allowing state and local managers to be both opportunistic and cooperative (Liebschutz, 1991; Agranoff and
McGuire, 2001; Brown and Potoski, 2003; Fowler, 2018a). As such, donor-recipient designs lead to a marked
improvement in air quality compared to central agency designs.
Donor-Recipient Design Hypothesis: In comparison to central agency designs, donor-recipient designs will be
correlated with improved air quality.
Fourth, regional agency designs are an adaptation of donor-recipient designs, where new agencies are created for
specified geographic areas via, in most cases, regional SIPs (Woods and Potoski, 2010; Fowler, 2016, 2018). Possibly
the most textbook example of this approach is California, in which 35 regional agencies serve as lead agencies for
managing airsheds under the umbrella of the California Air Resources Board (CARB). Under this system, CARB
oversees state-level air quality policies and establishes state minimum standards, but regional agencies address local
air quality through enforcement of state regulations and/or local regulations targeting specific issues within each
district. Additionally, regional agencies work with local governments on issues, such as transportation or economic
development planning, that may affect regional air quality. In essence, SIPs allot regional agencies a significant
amount of discretion within their designated jurisdictions, but CARB retains oversight authority and serves as a statelevel policymaking body to address issues that may stretch across regions (CARB, 2018; EPA, 2018c). Other states
relying, at least partially, on regional agency designs include Ohio, Oregon, and Washington; however, California is
the only state to rely solely on regional agencies.
Although similar to both top-down and donor-recipient designs, these designs generate new transaction costs and
constraints on local implementation expertise that do not exist in other designs. Since their mission focuses on CAA
implementation, regional air agencies largely function as extensions of state agencies, even though they have some
bargaining power (Woods and Potoski, 2010). On the positive side, regional managers build specialized capacities
without facing competing demands to deliver other services. In particular, air quality management tends to involve
monitoring and testing equipment that is not applicable to other public services, which creates high fixed costs and
barriers to market entry. Specialized agencies overcome these issues by developing specific capacities for a unique
purpose (Cannibal and Lemon, 2000; Brown and Potoski, 2003, 2005; Brown, et al., 2008; Hefetz and Warner, 2012).
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On the other hand, a single policy function limits the ability of regional managers to leverage resources, capacities, or
expertise gained from other policies areas. Unlike city managers, regional air managers cannot learn ways to become
more efficient from other implementation experiences, or supplement air programs with resources from other
programs. Additionally, at intermediate governmental levels, regional agencies create new bureaucratic layers and
face limitations in how well managers develop specific knowledge of local circumstances. Most importantly, policy
monopolies and specialized expertise create high potential for information asymmetries, where legislatures have
limited information about performance, costs, or service quality. Consequently, there is opportunity for specialized
agencies to act opportunistically in expanding resources or maximizing payoffs (Waterman and Meier, 1998; Brown
and Potoski, 2003; Brown, et al., 2006). As such, regional agency designs create more complexity than other designs,
so they rarely lead to better air quality in comparison to central agency designs.
Regional Agency Design Hypothesis: In comparison to central agency designs, regional agency designs will not be
correlated with improved air quality.
Finally, emergent governance institutional designs occur when local governments not included in CAA
implementation find innovate ways to govern air quality from outside state-led systems. By nature, emergent
governance designs are less of a conscious top-down effort at organizing institutions than other designs, and more of
a result of bottom-up innovation in response to perceived deficiencies in state-led efforts (Agranoff and McGuire,
2001; Volden, 2005; Riverstone-Newell, 2013; Fowler, 2018b). For example, Colorado’s SIP designates the Colorado
Department of Public Health and the Environment (CDPHE) as the lead agency for CAA implementation, and CDPHE
further delegates some responsibility to Larimer County’s Department of Health in a top-down arrangement. Starting
in the early 1990’s, the City of Forth Collins’s became more involved in air quality when EPA determined levels of
carbon dioxide in the regional airshed exceeded national minimum standards. Early on, Fort Collins worked with
state and county agencies to address this issue. By the mid-2000s, when carbon dioxide was reduced to acceptable
levels, the City shifted its focus away from coordinating efforts and towards policy innovation in response to a citizen
mandate that emphasized air quality standards beyond federal and state standards (Fort Collins, 1996, 2011).
Furthermore, the City’s air quality plan identifies its goals as to “[c]omplement and fill gaps left by federal, state and
county efforts” and “[r]espond to a strong citizen mandate for the City to protect and improve air quality” (Fort Collins,
2004, p. 4). This highlights perceptions that local agencies are addressing deficits in state and federal policies and
developing their own distinct programs. To this end, Fort Collins adopted a plan to align citywide policies with its air
quality goals and to work collaboratively across the region with public agencies as well as non-governmental
organizations to reduce emissions. The City also routinely solicits public input on air quality issues (Fort Collins,
2011). Although Fort Collins is advanced in comparison to other cities, similar cases appear in Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, and New York. With the advent of self-organization around policy goals, emergent governance designs
represent a shift from intergovernmental policy implementation to inter-organizational policy governance, so
hierarchical coordination around legislatively mandated policy outputs is no longer a guiding principal (Osborne,
2006). Here, local air agencies do not have formal connections (e.g., mandates) to state agencies, and are not part of
SIPs. Consequently, local managers do not participate in CAA implementation, so their focus is on managing air
quality rather than implementing federal legislation.
Without the burden of policy implementation responsibilities, hierarchical controls on innovation, or resource
dependencies, local agencies position themselves to solve problems through interactions with a variety of different
organizations, but face institutional barriers to collective action in doing so (Feiock and Scholz, 2009). While strategic
action or resource competition are a driving force for some, others focus on collaboration to pursue goals that cannot
be achieved otherwise. These types of designs “often find reasonable solution approaches, but then run into
operational, performance, or legal barriers that prevent the next action step… [and] face challenges in converting
solutions into policy energy, assessing internal effectiveness, surmounting the inevitable process blockages, mission
drift, and so on” (McGuire and Agranoff, 2011, p. 265). Furthermore, agency interactions may become excessively
complex and lead to overprocessing, so there is an economy of scale for transaction costs that ultimately limits
efficacy. Although scalability is a challenge, emergent governance designs improve upon designs that only rely on
states agencies, by allowing local managers to act strategically in managing air quality (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001;
Hicklin, O’Toole, and Meier, 2008; McGuire and Agranoff, 2011; Provan and Lemaire, 2012). As such, emergent
governance designs lead to a marked improvement in air quality compared to central agencies designs.
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Emergent Governance Design Hypothesis: In comparison to central agency designs, emergent governance designs
will be correlated with improved air quality.
Methods
Data and Dependent Variable
The full dataset included 522 AQCRs that were air quality monitoring sites in both 2010 and 2013, but due to data
limitations, our analytical sample includes 363 AQCRs that represent 47 states.2 These AQCRs range in size from
9,470,069 (Chicago, IL) to 18,012 (Los Alamos, NM). There are no significant discrepancies between full and
analytical datasets, with the latter appearing to be representative of the former in regards to major socio-economic
factors. For instance, in the analytical dataset, average population and per capita income were 506,356 and $35,462,
respectively, while in the full dataset, they were 511,262 and $35,484, respectively. Additionally, average 2010 air
quality index (AQI) score for the full dataset was 39.17 compared to 39.20 for the analytical dataset. For our dependent
variable, we measure air quality outcomes as annual median AQI for each AQCR, with data from EPA’s AirData
system. Since criteria pollutants are not directly comparable to each other, AQI creates a standardized measure to
evaluate air quality and program success. AQI operates as a piecewise linear function of pollutant concentrations,
measured on a scale from 0 to 500 (EPA, 2016b).
As previous research indicates a lagged dependent variable is necessary as changes in air quality take years to manifest,
we use a three year lag, observing independent variables in 2010 and dependent variable in 2013, with 2010 to 2013
being a unique period for air quality (Ringquist, 1993a; Fowler, 2016). More specifically, after years of stagnant
expenditure growth for pollution control and abatement (averaging 1.96% between 1993 and 2009), President Barack
Obama increased spending in 2009 by 36.39% (largest annual increase since 1977). Spending levels were maintained
until 2013 when the new Republican-controlled Congress return to previous spending levels (Office of Management
and Budget (OMB), 2018). This short-lived boost in spending is also observable at state- and local-levels (Census,
2018; OMB, 2018). While previous periods of incrementalism likely lead to managerial stagnation, 2010 to 2013
created a radical change and challenged status quos. As a corollary, there are no discernible trends in air quality
between 2000 and 2009, but from 2010 to 2013, the average AQI declined from 39.17 to 37.56. Consequently, this
represents a radical period of change that allows us to compare initial air quality resulting from decades of status quo
management to air quality resulting from three years of radical change. Therefore, if variation in institutional designs
affect outcomes, then it is most likely to be observable during this period.
Institutional Designs
We classified institutional designs with a three-step methodology. First, we identified local air agencies, using the
National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA) and previous scholarship (e.g., Woods and Potoski, 2010).
Second, we used SIPs and surveys of state and local members of NACAA to determine state-local relationships. We
contacted the 168 members listed in the online directory three times via mail and email. Of 103 (61.3% response rate)
total respondents, 19 (38% of state agencies) were state-level and 84 (71.2% of local agencies) local-level.
Respondents represented 24 of 26 states with local air agencies. 3 We asked respondents to indicate whether four types
of authorities were delegated to local agencies in their state: 1) to set criteria pollutant ambient standards; 2) to set
new source performance standards; 3) to set hazardous air pollutant standards; and, 4) to enforce federal and/or state
air standards (Woods and Potoski, 2010). Additionally, we asked respondents to identify types of policy tools they
used (e.g., pollution prevention, outreach, regional cooperation, smart growth initiatives, or energy and transportation
planning). Then, we reviewed SIPs to confirm.
Third, we created decision rules to classify AQCRs based on state and local authorities and policies. Initially, we
classified any AQCR without a local air agency as central agency designs (417 total AQCRs; 281 in analytical sample).
Next, if local agencies are not delegated authorities for setting air standards but do have authorities for enforcing state
and federal standards, we assumed that they function as state administrative subunits in a compliance management

2

Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) does not report data when doing so discloses confidential information. Outlier analyses indicated three
AQCRs fell outside normal ranges for leverage and normalized residual values.
3
For these two states, only SIPs were used to determine institutional designs.
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role. Further analyses of SIPs and survey data related to policy tools indicates these agencies mostly enforce
policies that align with state-led strategies (i.e., pollution prevention). As such, we classified AQCRs with these
agencies as top-down designs (33 AQCRs in total; 29 in analytical sample).
Next, if local agencies are delegated regulatory and enforcement authorities, we assumed that they are semiautonomous (i.e., not administrative subunits) and are central to intergovernmental management strategies.
Additionally, SIPs and survey responses indicate that these local agencies manage policies that both align with stateled strategies and that provide local context to state-led strategies (i.e., smart growth initiatives). However, regional
air agencies are a class unto themselves as they are not connected to a general purpose government (e.g., city or
county), specialize in an asset specific service, operate on a regional scale, and function at an intermediate-level within
the federal hierarchy (Fowler, 2016, 2018). In general, SIPs create regional air agencies to serve as lead agency for
coordinating efforts across geographically defined airsheds. As such, we divided AQCRs with agencies that have
both regulatory and enforcement authorities into two groups: donor-recipient as those associated with a city or county
government (7 AQCRs in total; 6 in analytical sample); and, regional agencies as independent, regional agencies (48
AQCRs in total; 36 in analytical sample).
Finally, if local agencies are neither delegated authorities nor have formal roles, we assumed that they function outside
of conventional management strategies coordinated by the state. While SIPs and survey data indicate these agencies
have no formal authorities and do not enforce state-led policies, survey data also indicates that regional cooperation
is most common policy tool, while policies that aligned with state-led strategies (i.e., pollution prevention) were not
used. As such, we classified AQCRs with these agencies as emergent governance designs (16 AQCRs in total; 11 in
analytical sample).
For statistical analyses, we operationalization institutional design variables in two ways. First, we use nominal dummy
variables that compare AQCRs relying only on central agency designs (77.4% of AQCRs in analytical dataset) to
those with top-down (8.0%), regional agency (9.9%), donor-recipient (1.7%), or emergent governance (3.0%) designs.
In some cases, AQCRs within the same state may fall under different institutional designs. Second, since some local
agencies only control a portion of AQCRs, their impact is likely a function of relative jurisdictional control. To
account for these effects, we created interval variables by multiplying dummy variables by the portion of MSAs and
µSAs falling under respective jurisdictions. We assumed that portions of MSAs and µSAs not within local agency
jurisdictions default to central agency design. Therefore, in the analytical sample, central agency designs accounts for
81.7% of metropolitan populations within AQCRs, top-down 5.3%, regional agency 9.9%, donor-recipient 0.9%, and
emergent governance 2.2%. However, as regional agencies are exclusively regional planning agencies with authority
over entire AQCRs, there are only two values, 0 and 1 (i.e., 0% or 100%), causing this variable to default to a nominal
dummy variable. As such, we include this variable alongside interval-level variables, but do not interpret as such.
Other Predictors
We control for state and federal management factors, local socio-economics, region, and existing air quality. First, as
states play a central role in CAA implementation, we control for state environmental expenditures per capita and
agency organization (Ringquist, 1993a, 1993b; Bacot and Dawes, 1997; Potoski and Woods, 2002; Fowler, 2016).
We use a dummy variable to compare states using a pollution control agency to states with other types of agencies
(e.g., health) (Ringquist, 1993b; Fowler, 2012). Additionally, since 2010 involved substantial growth in federal
environmental expenditures, we control for percentage change of federal aid to state and local environmental programs
from 2009 to 2010. Second, local socio-economic factors affect environmental outcomes through pollutant
production, environmental attitudes, and political interests, so we control for both local population and per capita
income (Ringquist, 1993a; Potoski and Woods, 2002). Additionally, we control for industry with percentage of local
economies from manufacturing and transportation industries, which are key stationary sources of air pollutants. Third,
since regional variations account for geographic trends that affect both environmental conditions and norms of
environmental management, we control for region using dummy variables to compare the Northeast, Midwest, and
West U.S. Census regions to the South (Emison and Morris, 2010). Finally, we control for existing pollution levels
with annual median AQI for initial observation year (Ringquist, 1993b; Bacot and Dawes, 1997; Potoski and Woods,
2002; Fowler, 2012).
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Analysis
Since we believe, it is likely that existing air quality affects institutional design and institutional design then affects
future air quality; over time, there is likely reciprocal correlation. As such, it is not possible to control for initial AQI
without adjusting for this endogeneity or to test the relationship between institutional design and air quality without
controlling for existing differences in air quality. Consequently, we use two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression
(Meier and O’Toole, 2002; Sovey and Green, 2011). We use as instruments four variables correlated with existing
air quality (prior economic growth, prior population growth, AQI days above 150, and population centers within
AQCRs)4; then, the purged form of initial AQI corrects for reciprocal correlation in the model.5 We subsequently
confirmed appropriateness of these instruments with both the Hansen J-statistic and Kleibergen-Paap test, which
indicate that these variables satisfy the exogeneity and relevance conditions for instrumental variables (Gabel and
Scheve, 2007; Sovey and Green, 2011). Further diagnostic tests indicated no other assumptions were violated.
Finally, since unit of analysis is AQCR but CAA implementation tends to be coordinated at the state-level, we cluster
standard errors at that level. As such, we assume that state-level factors cause model errors for AQCRs in the same
state to be correlated while errors for AQCRs in different states to be uncorrelated (Primo, Jacobsmeier, and Milyo,
2007).
Results and Discussion
Table 1 displays 2SLS results with nominal and interval institutional design variables. In general, findings indicate
that institutional designs have substantive effects on air quality outcomes, but these substantive effects are a function
of jurisdictional sizes. First, based on nominal comparison (model 1.1), donor-recipient designs were correlated with
AQI decreases of 4.45 compared to central agency designs (11.36% decrease over average 2010 AQI); and, based on
interval comparisons (model 2.1), when jurisdictional sizes of donor-recipient agencies increase by 1% of metropolitan
population, there is a corresponding decrease in AQI by 5.83 (14.88% decrease). On the other hand, emergent
governance designs were correlated with AQI decreases of 3.96 compared to central agency designs (model 1.1)
(10.11% decrease), and jurisdictional sizes increases of 1% corresponded to an AQI decrease of 4.94 (model 2.1)
(12.61% decrease).
[Tables 2 about here]

4

While population and economic growth are commonly associated with environmental conditions, changes in SIPs are incremental with fe w
significant revisions occurring since the 1990 CAA amendments (Woods and Potoski, 2010). Number of AQI days above 150 and number of
population centers measure extremes in AQI and areas of concentrated pollutant emissions. Conversely, since days above 150 mostly serves as a
point of reference to communicate "bad air" days to the public, it is unlikely that states would design institutions around a measure of air quality
that is not considered in performance goals (EPA, 2018d). Population centers would likely only be associated with institutional designs if SIPs
required municipalities to be involved in air management. However, this is not the case, so there is no reason to believe an association between
population centers and institutional designs exist. Correlation analyses confirmed these associations.
5
Addressing temporal issues effectively enough to provide an accurate comparison between institutional designs that have been in place for four
or five decades to more recent approaches that have been for less than two decades is the most challenging part of this research design. Our findings
presented below provide evidence of notable differences, but there are important limitations to that evidence. Namely, we assume in instrumenting
air quality that the chief concern here is that prior performance (i.e., air quality in 2010) is correlated with the error term of future performance (i.e.,
air quality in 2013). In other words, there are a series of socio-economic or environmental conditions that have led to both air quality conditions
prior to 2010 and institutional designs that continue to effect air quality conditions in 2013. If left unattended, this the n presents bias in our model,
where those conditions may be more explanatory then institutional designs in themselves. In order to address this, we use instrumental variables
on air quality in 2010), so we are then making a comparison based on unbiased prior performance. Thus, we assume that any di fferences are a
result of institutional designs. On the other hand, we could assume that there are other contextual factors inherent in each design that are also
correlated with air quality (i.e., managerial quality), and therefore should use instrumental variables on institutional designs. However, this runs
into two distinct challenges. First, it requires us to make several assumptions about the evolution of institutional designs, and how those factors
then may also impact air quality. In general, there is scant evidence suggesting why different institutional designs exist. Fowler and Jones
(forthcoming) is the most recent and sophisticated analysis to date, and suggests there are at least two trends that explain why different types of
local air agencies exist: one from the top-down where state make choices in delegating authorities, and one from the bottom-up where local
governments choose to innovate. Second, and by extension, there would then need to be a distinct set of instrumental variables for each institutional
design. In turn, this may create unintended consequences and introduce other forms of bias. Most importantly though, finding “good” instrumental
variables is difficult and many of the unobserved differences in institutional designs may not be measurable (i.e., innovatio n capacity). Given the
trade-offs in pursuing this research design, we erred on the side of caution in order to control for the bias that we can reasonably assume exists and
make inferences about, rather than biases that we are unsure of and do not fully understand. In general, this research design looks at a “snapshot”
in which institutional designs should be comparable in terms of the context of managing air quality as a way of determining if certain mechanisms
of organization produce better outcomes.
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These findings likely result from incorporating local expertise and capacity into managerial efforts, while minimizing
transaction costs associated with inter-organizational interactions, which support our donor-recipient and emergent
governance design hypotheses. In both cases, local managers likely adapt administrative processes to local
circumstances better than in other designs. Rather than rely on state-led command-and-control regulatory approaches,
local governments are integrating air quality into their decision calculus on numerous city and county policies as a
means to coordinate environmental quality goals with urban growth and development, as well as experimenting with
mechanisms to encourage emissions reductions. In effect, these institutional designs produce positive tradeoffs when
shifting approaches to decision-making and goals from central agency designs. However, donor-recipient consistently
outperforms emergent governance designs. Since results from interval variables indicate effectiveness of donorrecipient increases as jurisdictions expand at a higher rate than for emergent governance designs, findings likely reflect
scalability of donor-recipient designs, where benefits and costs increase at comparable rates. On the other hand,
managerial complexities in emergent governance designs likely cause transaction costs to increase at higher rates than
benefits, slowing rates of increased effectiveness as jurisdictions grow (Hicklin, et al., 2008; McGuire and Agranoff,
2011). Consequently, when jurisdictions are large, transaction costs add up and effectiveness increases at a slower
rate than in donor-recipient designs.
Second, regional agency designs are correlated with AQI increases of 2.34 (model 1.1) and 2.45 (model 2.1) compared
to central agency designs (5.97% and 6.25% increase, respectively). While regional agency is used in model 2.1 with
interval variables, it is measured as a nominal variable, so it is interpreted in the same way as findings from model
1.1. Although there is no data related to how variations in jurisdictional sizes affect outcomes, these findings support
our regional agency hypothesis, and suggest these designs may not be a successful approach to adapting management
strategies to local circumstances. This likely results from ineffective organization that include additional bureaucratic
layers and policy monopolies. Additionally, these designs are more likely than others to produce information
asymmetries that lead to self-interested bureaucratic behavior (Waterman and Meier, 1998; Brown and Potoski, 2003).
However, these findings do not consider how operations may be affected by variations in regional agency structures,
such as relationships with local or state agencies and roles of elected officials in agency oversight. While empirical
findings suggest these designs are likely correlated with poor air quality, additional research is needed to further
understand how policy implementation occurs under regional agencies. This is particularly important considering the
regional nature of air quality, and stark contrasts between regional agencies and emergent governance designs, which
also incorporate a regional component to air quality management.
Third, as findings for both top-down designs (models 1.1 and 2.1) were not statistically significant, it is difficult to
determine what substantive effects these designs have on air quality outcomes. Nevertheless, at minimum, we can
determine that top-down in comparison to central agency designs are correlated with generalizable improvements in
air quality. While somewhat limited, these findings do provide support for our top-down hypothesis. Fourth, we also
include models 2.1 and 2.2 as a baseline model (i.e., central agency compared to all other designs). Given competing
directional effects for other institutional designs, it is unsurprising findings were not statistically significant. There is
some probative value in these models though. Specifically, standard errors for central agency and regional agency
designs were comparatively smaller than those for donor-recipient and emergent governance designs. This may
suggest that although donor-recipient and emergent governance designs have a more substantive effect on air quality
on average, there is a greater degree of inconsistency of those effects compared to other designs, which may result
from greater opportunities for local agencies to work shirk. On the other hand, central agency designs may create a
higher degree of regulatory consistency than designs that incorporate local agencies, which may be a key argument
for central agency designs in the face of fragmented regulatory regimes.
However, the differences in standard error may also be explained by more observations of central agency compared
to other designs. Specifically, central agency designs make up the lion’s share (77.4%) of our dataset, so naturally,
there would be less standard error in those results. Conversely, emergent governance designs and donor-recipient
designs are relatively underrepresented in our dataset (3.0% and 1.7%, respectively). Of course, our chief constraint
here is real world variation in agency designs, since our dataset includes almost the entire population for each of these
designs. On one hand, our findings are statistically significant, which would indicate generalizability. On the other
hand, we are attempting to draw conclusions based on a small number of agencies, which increase the likelihood of
type-1 error (i.e., false positives). Consequently, we draw conclusions with a degree of circumspection as it relates to
these designs. Regional agency and top-down designs make up relatively larger portions of our dataset (9.9% and
8.0%, respectively), so we have more confidence in those findings.
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Other political, socio-economic, and environmental factors are also substantive predictors of air quality outcomes.
Positive coefficients for regional variables indicate the Northeast and West regions are consistently more likely to
have higher AQI than the South region. Negative coefficients for state environmental expenditures and mini-EPA
indicates that increased state spending and state pollution control agencies (when compared to alternative types of
environmental agencies) are correlated with decreased AQIs. However, previous research indicates expenditures
rarely have a direct relationship with environmental outcomes, and other political and socioeconomic factors are
typically more important predictors (Bacot and Dawes, 1997). This is particularly notable in relation to federal aid to
state and local environmental programs, in which a positive coefficient suggests increased aid is correlated with higher
AQIs; however, this finding was not statistically significant. Findings for existing air quality conditions were as
expected, with current conditions as the best predictor of future conditions. Although not statistically significant,
coefficients for population and per capita income indicate that economic development is positively correlated with
AQI. These findings are consistent with previous literature on the relationship between socio-economics and air
quality (Ringquist, 1993a, 1993b; Fowler, 2016).
While findings support our hypotheses, temporal issues in our research design create notable limitations. More
specifically, institutional designs for managing air quality evolved over decades, but that evolution is inconsistent and
somewhat unclear across states, which constrains our ability to incorporate temporal data into our research design.
Given this, we rely on a cross-sectional “snapshot” to identify the relationship between institutional designs and air
quality, but this does not incorporate potentially important observations concerning how these variables relate to each
other over time. Most significantly, there is likely a degree of reciprocal correlation between institutional designs and
air quality, where institutions affect air quality and then air quality affects institutional changes. We use 2SLS to
correct for this, but this technique is limited by our identification and operationalization of instrumental variables.
Additionally, institutional designs may be endogenous with each other. For example, designs that incorporate local
agencies are likely a response to failures that occurred when states implemented the CAA under central agency
designs. In fact, some states did not devolve authorities for air quality regulations to local governments until the
1990s, and emergent governance designs did not emerge until the 2000s. Furthermore, we may not be able to expect
continual improvement in air quality over time as air pollutants can only be practically reduced to a minimal value.
As such, some institutional designs may produce large improvements initially before plateauing, others may lead to
incremental changes over time, and still others may run into institutional barriers before producing gains. As these
changes occurred incrementally at different times in different states, we cannot correct for this using instrumental
variables, and data on local air agencies is not available prior to our survey. Thus, we assume that if we isolate these
institutional designs within a unique time period in which radical changes in environmental management occurred at
the national-level, then we can attribute fluctuations within AQCRs to contemporary institutional designs present at
that time. However, this does not tell us how rates of change during any time period other than three-years
accumulates; that is, our results are not nuanced enough to indicate whether small changes over time or one large
change accounts for differences that manifest between 2010 and 2013.6 Consequently, additional research is necessary
to further parse out the specific rate of improvements that occur as a result of these institutional designs, and the
comparative utility of incremental versus rational departures from the status quo when it comes to air quality and other
environmental conditions.
Given this, we must also consider whether these findings are generalizable outside of the unique period from 2010 to
2013. Most likely, similar patterns occur during other time periods, particularly as it applies to comparisons between
central agency and other designs as those findings are relatively strong. However, other findings discussed here may
fluctuate with the ebb and flow of national environmental policies, as national and subnational governments jockey
for position within the federal hierarchy. Most significantly, this likely effects the comparative efficacy of emergent
governance designs as EPA shifts its approach to environmental regulation in response to presidential or congressional
environmental agendas and sends ripples through the intergovernmental environmental management system (Konisky
and Woods, 2016).

6

Other lag periods produced similar results, but they were not as a good of a fit for the data. Previous research on this subject would suggest it
takes time for policy differences to manifest in actual air quality conditions, because the causal change from policy to socio-economic changes to
air quality is so complex. Thus, looking at shorter period of times may be misleading or create new avenue for bias.
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Conclusions
Ideally, government is organized for purposes of effectiveness, efficiency, or democratic accountability; however,
politicians make tradeoffs between political goals, transaction costs, performance, and accountability in designing
institutions (Wood and Bohte, 2004). While innovative solutions for managing complex problems emerged in recent
decades, more traditional approaches persist. As such, several institutional designs exist simultaneously and present
tradeoffs in how subnational governments are organized. While some designs may appear antiquated, it is likely that
they are either effective enough or at least not ineffective enough to warrant change. Findings for central agency and
top-down designs suggest those approaches satisfice in maintaining air quality, which wards off challenges to their
efficacy. In both cases, evidence is insufficient to determine directional effects and either may result in positive or
negative changes in air quality under certain circumstances. In other words, it is not that there are no effects of these
designs in comparison to other institutional designs. It is that effects may be too minimal or too variable to make a
specific determination that alternative designs will lead to better performance, which likely provides sufficient cause
for politicians to avoid uncertainty in administrative reform (Potoski, 2002; Wood and Bohte, 2004; Moynihan 2005).
More interestingly, findings indicate that when governmental units organize around shared policy goals and challenge
formal hierarchies (i.e., emergent governance), policy outcomes are better than three of four conventional
intergovernmental designs (i.e., central agency, top-down, and regional agency). However, emergent governance
designs underperform compared to the fourth design (i.e., donor-recipient). Although emergent governance and
donor-recipient designs partially rely on similar organizational mechanisms (i.e., empowering local managers to
function as problem solvers), emergent governance designs place local managers outside of CAA implementation and
are driven by bottom-up, rather than top-down, decisions. On the other hand, donor-recipient designs create avenues
for bargaining between state and local managers, and capitalize on local expertise in adapting intergovernmental
management strategies to local circumstances. Other intergovernmental designs are not organized to allow local
managers to play similar roles though, and in many cases, there are institutional barriers to doing so. Consequently,
how local agencies are incorporated into intergovernmental policy implementation is a pivotal question in determining
how effective institutional designs are. In many cases, effectiveness comes down to specific contexts and policy
enterprises, and whether organizations have necessary capacities to overcome barriers to their success (Brown and
Potoski, 2003; McGuire and Agranoff, 2011). Nevertheless, given limitations to our analysis, we are cautious in
drawing these conclusions, especially for emergent governance and regional agencies.
While alternative organizational approaches may provide better mechanisms to do this in some cases, those
circumstances do not always exist, so conventional intergovernmental management still presents a viable option.
Although organizing governmental units based on shared policy goals largely results from limitations created by
complex policy problems, there are still mixed reviews of how effective these approaches are, especially in comparison
to more conventional forms of intergovernmental management (Feiock and Scholz, 2009; Andrews and Entwistle,
2010; McGuire and Agranoff, 2011). For air quality, organizing around shared policy goals is only the best option if
there are institutional barriers to bargaining between state and local officials. However, these institutional barriers are
the circumstances that lead public agencies to re-organize themselves around shared policy goals in the first place
(Feiock and Scholz, 2009). As such, our findings suggest two somewhat complementary conclusions. First, when
institutions are designed to allow bargaining between local and state officials, intergovernmental management is the
most effective approach for matching managerial efforts to complex policy problems. Second, in absence of those
mechanisms, intergovernmental management is less effective than public agencies self-organizing around shared
policy goals. These findings provide additional insights into why more governance-oriented strategies are necessary
in the face of institutional barriers, as innovative actors can more effectively manage complex problems by breaking
away from conventional approaches.
As findings are limited to a unique policy area in the U.S., this begs the question of whether these findings are
applicable to other policy domains or federal systems. Although many other federal environmental (e.g., Clean Water
Act) and social programs (e.g., Medicaid) rely on subnational governments for implementation, air quality is a high
asset specific policy area and the CAA creates a somewhat rigid framework of state responsibilities compared to other
policies (Brown and Potoski, 2003; Woods and Potoski, 2010). Most obviously, this causes a preponderance of central
agency designs in our dataset, where alternative designs may be more common in other policy areas. Additionally,
the U.S. is not the only federal system and emergent governance approaches are becoming more common worldwide
as national and subnational governments grapple with institutional barriers to collective action (e.g., Tavares and
Feiock, 2018 or Chen, Ma, Feiock, and Suo, 2019). A key component of our comparison of institutional designs is
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how subnational governments are coordinated to manage complex policy problems that challenge vertical and
horizontal fragmentation of regulatory regimes. Although both our analysis and a mass of research has focused on
the U.S., this a common problem in most advanced democracies with institutional authorities divided geographically.
While specific institutional features may vary, effectiveness is likely still a function of the tradeoffs made in balancing
decision-making and transaction costs as implementation systems expand to incorporate different policy actors.
Importantly though, effectiveness may not be the most important performance indicator in some policy areas or
nations, so advantages or disadvantages of designs may lie elsewhere (e.g., equity) (Andrews and Entwistle, 2010).
Consequently, whether conventional intergovernmental management outperforms emergent governance will depend
on the problem parameters and how important local capacities are for policy success. As such, further research is
necessary to consider these designs within the context of other federal programs, policy areas, and national systems
to determine how policy problems affect the utility of certain institutional features. Additionally, scholars should
further consider how spatial issues affect design efficacy as geographic distributions of environmental and institutional
challenges vary across subnational governments. Institutional designs should also be examined as dependent
variables, and how political transaction costs and performance outcomes lead to innovation (or lack thereof).
Finally, temporal challenges in our research design highlight how difficult it is compare institutional designs that have
been operational for several decades to those that are still emerging. Given the rather piecemeal fashion in which
administrative reforms occur in federalist systems, this draws important questions concerning whether initial
transaction costs of redesigning intergovernmental systems are worth it and whether more conventional
intergovernmental relations have plateaued in their effectiveness for managing complex policy problems. Our
research design uses a “snapshot” of these designs during a unique period of time, but does not consider some
potentially significant issues in how designs evolved and how the relationship between designs and air quality changes
over time. To this end, scholars need to consider other more sophisticated methodologies to examine these types of
differences in order to make more rigorous comparisons between traditional mechanisms of intergovernmental
management and cutting edge trends in emergent governance. Despite recent innovations, more traditional approaches
to managing policy problems in a federal system persist and have important implications for understanding governance
of emerging challenges.
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Tables
Table 1. Comparison of Institutional Designs
Institutional
design

Agencies

Coordination mechanisms

Advantages

Constraints

Central
agencies

State

Policy monopoly

Minimizes coordination
costs; reduces
bureaucratic layers

No access to local
capacities or resources

Top-down

State;
local

Directed by state agency;
local serves as state subunit

Incorporates local
capacities and resources

Coordination costs; local
agencies are compliance
managers

Bottom-up

State;
local

Bargaining between state
and local

Incorporates local
capacities and resources

Coordination and
bargaining costs

Regional
agencies

State;
regional

Directed by state agency;
some bargaining between
state and regional

Development of
specialized capacities

Additional layer of
bureaucracy; information
asymmetries

Emergent
governance

State;
local

Self-organization

Local flexibility

Economy of scale for
transaction costs

Table 2. Results of 2SLS Models
Model 1.1
Model 1.2
Central agency
-.480 (.800)
Top-down
.837 (1.330)
Donor-recipient
-4.453 (1.895)*
Regional agency
2.338 (.956)*
Emerg. governance
-3.960 (1.520)**
State Expenditures
-.034 (.009)***
-.030 (.009)***
Federal Aid
.008 (.010)
.006 (.009)
Mini-EPA
-2.284 (.881)**
-2.102 (.870)*
Population
.067 (.051)
.044 (.061)
Income
.071 (.060)
.062 (.062)
Industry %
-14.228 (410.563)
11.723 (411.861)
Northeast
4.179 (1.425)**
4.073 (1.514)**
Midwest
1.660 (1.324)
1.630 (1.296)
West
7.762 (1.534)***
8.168 (1.761)***
Initial AQI
.853 (.128)***
.860 (.137)***
Constant
-2.215
-1.620
R-squared
.753
.743
BIC
2389.475
2386.126
N
363
363
Note: *<.05, **<.01, ***<.001. Standard errors in parenthesis.
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Model 2.1
2.253 (1.602)
-5.826 (2.884)*
2.452 (.954)**
-4.939 (1.435)***
-.037 (.008)***
.008 (.010)
-2.328 (.875)**
.052 (.056)
.070 (.061)
5.788 (406.362)
4.194 (1.447)**
1.590 (1.272)
7.757 (1.537)***
.850 (.130)***
-2.063
.754
2388.699
363

Model 2.2
-1.356 (.875)
-.032 (.009)***
.007 (.010)
-2.085 (.867)*
.040 (.062)
.061 (.063)
3.611 (406.064)
4.083 (1.523)**
1.579 (1.271)
7.813 (1.694)***
.854 (.135)***
-.512
.745
2383.767
363

